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New alternative measuring financial stability 
 
By Hassan Belkacem GHASSANa† 
 
Abstract. If the z-score index is widely used as a measure of the stability in conventional 
banks, it would be more reliable to find an appropriate measure of the stability forall type of 
banks. Knowing that the cooperative or Islamic banks follow different contracts forms of 
investments such the PLS system and are closer to real economic, by considering the 
illiquid assets, we expect that the new measure labelled g-score, associated to real economic 
growth, reflects multiple risks and allows to track the banking stability.  
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1. Introduction 
f good investment opportunities of banks are expected to support bank 
soundness, it would lead to more solvency of the bank, but bad investment may 
conduct to illiquidity problems, particularly in the long term. A situation where 
liabilities exceed assets is called insolvency i.e. there is less value of assets that the 
bank controls with a certain amount of equity. Consequently, the bank can’t be able 
to payback its money. According to Demirgüç-Kant et al. (2004) the liquidity 
variable, considered as exogenous and constructed from cash and some securities, 
can be used to measure bank risk. The liquidity dynamic, depending more on the 
financial strategy of the bank, cannot be considered as fully exogenous, it describes 
its proper financial behavior. In fact, the illiquidity would be more related to bank 
risk issue, where the share of illiquid assets in total assets exposes bank to 
insolvency risk even if the bank assets predominate liabilities. Recently, the Basel 
Committee (2010) established two official regulatory measures of liquidity risk, 
namely the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) for measuring short-term liquidity risk, 
and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) for determining long-term liquidity risk by 
considering both side of the balance sheet. A high value of each measure 
corresponds to high bank liquidity. There is a need of a quantitative analytical 
index to capture the banking stability through liquidity or illiquidity variables 
which affect largely the probability of bank default. 
Several well-known indices measure the financial stability mostly in banking 
sector. Among these indices, Value at Risk (Holton, 2003, Manganelli & Engle, 
2001), Stress Test (Aragonés et al., 2001, BIS, 2000) and z-score (Altman, 1983). 
The probabilistic version of z-score index makes it the most widely used (Lepetit & 
Strobel, 2015), in addition to its advantage in predicting the financial distress of 
bank and focuses on bank’s risk of insolvency. The other indices signal if the bank 
may face liquidity problems. These measures could be affected by the nature of the 
bank’s activities; for example, the z-score can’t be applied directly to cooperative 
banks (owned by their customers) or Islamic banks which use specific accounting 
methods and work in principles with the Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS) model which 
can expand the bank equity. The banks with capital risk are increasingly willing to 
consider transacting their assets in counter party arrangements whereby the credit-
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risk exposure is shared with the reduction in total risk in comparison to the lender 
system (Altman, Caouette & Narayan, 1998). The insolvency problem is more 
perilous than the liquidity one, as it means that the bank’s liabilities exceed the 
value of its assets. A bank may become illiquid even when it is solvent, if its assets 
held are illiquid assets (either long-term financial assets or real assets) that can only 
be liquidated at high cost, and associated with greater probability of loss. This 
point is well-documented by Allen & Gale (2004). But, the economic value of 
bank’s assets can be sufficient to cover its claims. The bank may be forced to sell 
part of such assets at lower prices than normal values. A measure of stable 
decomposition between liquid and illiquid assets could be more important and 
serving to manage early the risk of insolvency.  
 
2. Z-score and probability of default 
The time varying z-score using banks’ accounting quarterly data, with specific 
distinction in the balance sheet of each bank, is calculated using the following 
definitions: 
 
  𝑧𝑡 :𝑞 =
𝑘𝑡 :𝑞+𝜇𝑡
𝜎
, 𝑘𝑡:𝑞 =  
𝐸𝑡 :𝑞
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
 , 𝜇𝑡 =
𝑅 𝑡
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
  ,    𝜎2 = 𝑉  
𝑅𝑡 :𝑞
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
          (1) 
 
where 𝑘  is the ratio of equity capital plus total reserves to assets (CAR); μ 
represents the ratio of average returns to assets (ROA) i.e. profitability, where 
average returns are calculated on base of four observations per year. The variable 
𝑅 𝑡 is the mean of returns per quarter for the year 𝑡. The parameter σ stands for the 
standard deviation of returns to assets, and measures the volatility of returns on 
assets; it is calculated over the full sample with infra-annual data. The original z-
score (1) uses the standard deviation estimate of the return on assets, calculated 
over the full sample, and combine it with the current values of capital to assets ratio 
and a specific time-varying mean of returns on assets ratio based one the average 
per year of the quarterly net profit to avoid the seasonal volatility. In the related 
literature, there are many versions of z-score with yearly observations (as Boyd, De 
Nicolo & Jalal, 2006, Hesse & Cihak, 2007, Yeyati & Micco, 2007). Lepetit & 
Strobel (2013) well-document various measure of z-score with interesting 
empirical discussion. As supported by Laeven & Levine (2009) and Houston, 
Chen, Ping, & Yue (2010), in empirical implementation the logged z-score is used 
to reduce the skewness of the simple z-score (for more details see Lepetit & 
Strobel, 2015); but the logarithm could only smooth the distribution shape. 
The z-score reflects the probability of insolvency or bank liabilities  𝐿 exceed 
assets 𝐴 . From the accounting equation: 𝐴 = 𝐿 + 𝐸; and hence if 𝐿 > 𝐴, then 
𝐸 < 0. Assuming normality distribution of bank returns 𝑅, and defining insolvency 
as a state where losses exceed equity or capital i.e. −𝑅 ≥ 𝐸 ⇔ 𝑅 ≤ −𝐸 ⟹
𝑅 𝐴 ≤ −𝐸 𝐴  , we can write in term of probability that 𝑝 −𝑅 ≥ 𝐸 ⇔
𝑝 𝑅 ≤ −𝐸 ⟹ 𝑝 𝑅 𝐴 ≤ −𝐸 𝐴  , then the probability of default is  
 
𝑝  
𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸
𝐴
 ≡ 𝑝 μ ≤ −𝑘 =  N 0,1 dμ
−k
−∞
 
𝑝  
𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸
𝐴
 = 𝑝 
𝑅
𝐴
−𝜇𝑅
𝐴
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
≤
− 
𝐸
𝐴
+𝜇𝑅
𝐴
 
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
 = 𝑝 𝑍 ≤ −𝑧 = Φ −𝑧 = 1− Φ 𝑧          (2a) 
 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, corresponding to 
the left tail-distribution. The significant lower z-score for a bank indicates that this 
bank is closer to insolvency than another bank. The z-score measures the number 
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of standard deviations that returns realization have to fall to deplete equity (Čihak, 
2007). The greater z-score indicates the lower likelihood of bank insolvency risk; 
meaning that the probability that liabilities exceed assets is small i.e. there is no 
asset deficiency. The index will take high value when capitalization, measured in 
terms of risk error, is large. In many applications, the argument 𝑧 appears higher 
than 4, which means that the probability of insolvency is near to zero. There are 
some biases in z-score that underestimate largely the probability of default.  
Empirically, if the stochastic returns 𝑅 are not normally distributed, we can 
determine another probabilistic version of the z-score by using one-sided 
Chebyshev inequality (Boyd, Graham & Hewitt 1993, and others). By using the 
Markov inequality, we can show that for any random variable as 𝑅 𝐴  with its 
mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎2 for any shape of distribution, and any positive number 𝑎 
(which is satisfied because 𝑎 = k + μ > 0), the following one-side Chebyshev 
inequality holds. It is easy to prove this proposition: Considering b > 0, we obtain 
that  
 
𝑝  μ−
𝑅
𝐴
≥ 𝑎 = 𝑝  μ −
𝑅
𝐴
+ 𝑏 ≥ 𝑎 + 𝑏 ≤ 𝑝  μ−
𝑅
𝐴
+ 𝑏 
2
≥  𝑎 + 𝑏 2  
 
Upon applying Markov inequality on the preceding, we get that: 
 
𝑝  
𝑅
𝐴
≤ μ − 𝑎 ≤
E    μ−
𝑅
𝐴
 + 𝑏 
2
 
 𝑎 + 𝑏 2
=
σ2 + b2
 𝑎 + 𝑏 2
 
 
By letting 𝑏 =
σ2
𝑎
 and knowing that 𝑧𝜎 = k + μ = 𝑎, we obtain the following 
result:   
 
     𝑝  
𝑅
𝐴
≤ μ− 𝑎 = 𝑝  μ−
𝑅
𝐴
≥ 𝑎 ≤
σ2
σ2+a2
=
1
1+z2
< 1     (3) 
 
this gives the upper bound of the probability of insolvency in bank.1 This result is 
obtained in Lepetit & Strobel (2015, Proposition 1, page 216). It can be used across 
time as the probabilistic interpretation of z-score. But in practice, the use of this 
maximum level makes the default probability more pertinent for large sample.  
The z-score could be not appropriate to measure the risk of cooperative and 
Islamic banks, because the returns on assets depend on the nature of their activities. 
There is a need to construct an appropriate measure of risk considering the 
financing modes. We can focus on risks involved through the investment of banks 
in both liquid and illiquid assets. It would be particularly suitable for banks 
adopting investment strategies that prefer high risk assets given a high rate of 
return, or low risk assets even at low rate of returns, which guarantees the 
objectivity of the probability of default (Čihak & Hesse 2010). The long-term 
investments of banks with illiquid assets could lead to higher levels of economic 
output; in contrast, their short-term investments with liquid assets may conduct to 
speculative financing and causes economic and financial crises. The link between 
bank liquidity and economic growth is well-documented in Berger & Sedunov 
(2017). They find at aggregated per capita level a positive correlation between the 
output and the liquidity creation of banks. For many banks, there is a continuous 
trade-off between illiquid and liquid assets, each one influences the financial 
 
1
 By applying Cantelli’s inequality (which is a generalization of Chebyshev inequality), for any 
negative number 𝑎  satisfying 𝑎 = k + μ < 0 , 𝑝  
𝑅
𝐴
≤ μ− 𝑎 ≥ 1−
σ2
σ2+a2
. This case 
corresponds to a huge loss.     
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stability of the banks, but the contribution of illiquid assets to economic growth is 
more important for the long-run banking stability.  
Regarding the mobilization of both side of the balance-sheet i.e. assets and 
liabilities, the z-score index is not also compatible with the nature of cooperative 
banking and Islamic banking, because this latter relies mainly on the PLS system 
combining the liabilities with the assets in the investment processes. The PLS, 
expanding the bank equity and the investment opportunities, leads to a common 
risk of the investor and bank via Shariah compliant contracts like “Mudarabah” and 
“Musharakah”; and in consequence, reduce the financial fragility of the bank. It is 
probable that the capital value and reserves do not reflect the financial strength of 
Islamic banks, because the investor shall bear a part of the risk according to 
Shariah-terms of the PLS contracts, and thus reduce fairly the risk of Islamic 
Banks. These banks may seek for adjustments processes in risk-taking rates by the 
investors through appropriate contracts of PLS system and new methods of capital 
investment. As mentioned by Čihak & Hesse (2010), the conventional banks also 
seek for adjustment processes of interest rates on deposits and loans to avoid 
insolvency.  
 
3. G-score and illiquidity level 
Wagner (2007) stated that the liquid asset matters in banking stability. In the 
context of derivative instruments, he proved that an increase in liquidity rises 
retained risk and in crisis times reduces banking stability (Wagner 2007, 
Proposition 2, page 130). Also, He & Kondor (2016), by using stochastic dynamic 
model of liquidity management, show that the incentive of non-financial firms of 
the economy to shift from liquid resources to illiquid capital is stronger during 
booms than during recessions. Considering the financial firms as the banks, such 
shifting is inherent in their investment behavior.  
It is recognized from the bank balance sheet that the bank is in a financially 
healthy position when its assets are worth more than its liabilities.2 When the bank 
liquid assets are depleted, the bank will be unable to meet the demand for 
withdrawals. It will need cash or reserves from other banks or the central bank to 
face any withdrawals. But, if the bank cannot borrow or attract additional cash or 
reserves, it will sell-off at low prices a part of its illiquid assets i.e. loans for 
commercial banks or sharing for cooperative or Islamic banks. If the shareholder 
equity is less than the difference between book value and sell-off value, the bank 
becomes insolvent.  
The equation (2) describes the first case of commercial banks insolvency. The 
second case of the cooperative or Islamic banks, which work with the scheme of 
capital risk, is different. From the accounting equation, 𝐿 =  1− 𝜃 𝐷 + 𝜃𝐷 where 
𝐷 stands for deposits and 𝜃 is the invested share of the deposits as a contribution in 
the bank capital and  1 − 𝜃  is simply the remaining fraction of deposits as 
demand deposits; we have: 𝐴 =  1− 𝜃 𝐷 + 𝐸 𝜃  where 𝐸 𝜃 = 𝜃𝐷 + 𝐸. Hence, 
if 𝐿 > 𝐴, then 𝐸 < 0. Assuming normality distribution of bank returns 𝑅, and by 
the insolvency definition, we have 
 
−𝑅 ≥ 𝐸 𝜃 ≥ 𝐸 ⇔ 𝑅 ≤ −𝐸 𝜃 ≤ −𝐸 ⟹ 𝑅 𝐴 ≤ −𝐸 𝜃 𝐴 ≤ −𝐸 𝐴  , 
 
we can write in term of probability that 
 
𝑝 −𝑅 ≥ 𝐸 𝜃  ⇔ 𝑝 𝑅 ≤ −𝐸 𝜃  ⟹ 𝑝 𝑅 𝐴 ≤ −𝐸 𝜃 𝐴  , 
 
then the probability of default is 
 
2  The bank assets contain liquid (as cash, central bank reserves, bonds) and illiquid (loans or 
financing) assets. The bank liabilities include costumer deposits and shareholder equity. For more 
details on investment on illiquid assets, see Morawski (2008). 
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𝑝  
𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸 𝜃 
𝐴
 = 𝑝 
𝑅
𝐴
−𝜇𝑅
𝐴
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
≤
− 
𝐸 𝜃 
𝐴
+𝜇𝑅
𝐴
 
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
 = 𝑝 𝑍 ≤ −𝑧𝜃 = Φ −𝑧𝜃              (2b) 
 
We observe that the equation (2a) is a special case of a more generalized 
equation(2b) when 𝜃 = 0. More importantly, we deduce 𝑧𝜃 > 𝑧  and Φ −𝑧𝜃 <
Φ −𝑧 , meaning that the probability of insolvency is less in banks working with 
capital risk as PLS system than the probability of insolvency in banks working with 
loans system.  
In the line of the contribution of this paper and in the spirit of the NSFR of 
Basel III (considering both assets and liabilities), we suggest to use, as indicators of 
bank risks related to liquidity and leverage having randomness feature, the 
following ratios: 𝑟1 = 𝐿𝐴 𝐴  and 𝑟2 = 𝐴 𝐸  where 𝑟1  is the liquid assets (𝐿𝐴) to 
assets (𝐴) ratio labelled LAR, its complement ratio is the illiquid assets ratio 
𝐼𝐴 𝐴 = 1− 𝑟1); and 𝑟2 is the ratio of assets to equity (𝐸) i.e. capital of bank and 
total reserves. To exhibit the impact of illiquid assets as long-run investments on 
bank stability, it would be more accurate to consider the following formulation (4) 
with stock-based g-score definition:  
 
𝑔 =
𝐸 𝜃 
𝐴
+𝜇 
IA
𝐴
 
𝜎 
IA
𝐴
 
=
𝑟2
−1+ 1−𝑟1 
𝜎(1−𝑟1)
          (4) 
 
and its operational definition (5) 
 
𝑔𝑡:𝑞 =
𝑘𝑡 :𝑞+𝜇 𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡
𝜎𝐼𝐴
, 𝑘𝑡:𝑞 =  
𝐸 𝜃 𝑡 :𝑞
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
 , 𝜇𝐼𝐴𝑡 =
𝐼𝐴   𝑡
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
  ,    𝜎𝐼𝐴
2 = 𝑉  
𝐼𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
     (5) 
 
In the line of z-score measure and as an alternative, we can consider a flow-
based z-score, defined in (6) as follows:    
 
𝑧𝑡:𝑞 =
𝑘𝑡 :𝑞+𝜇𝑅𝐼𝐴 ,𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝐼𝐴
, 𝑘𝑡:𝑞 =  
𝐸 𝜃 𝑡 :𝑞
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
 , 𝜇𝑅,𝑡 =
𝑅 𝐼𝐴 𝑡
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
  ,    𝜎𝑅
2 = 𝑉  
𝑅𝐼𝐴 𝑡 :𝑞
𝐴𝑡 :𝑞
    (6) 
 
where 𝜇 and 𝜎 correspond to the average and standard deviation, respectively. The 
advantage of this measure is that the liquidity source could be detected in both side 
of the balance sheet i.e. from assets and liabilities. The measure g-score is based on 
an indicator of bank insolvency focusing on bank’s risk of illiquidity. It would be 
more reliable to cooperative or Islamic banks which work in principles with the 
PLS system, requiring direct participation of banks to the investment processes. 
The leverage variable 𝑟2 is related mostly to debt financing, since it is influenced 
by the share of illiquid assets to total assets. In conventional banks, the increasing 
leverage through financing a part of their assets by debts, may be a sign of 
apprising problems such the probability of insolvency. The debt finance does not 
apply to Islamic banks, they use their own sources as equity, retained profits, and 
provisions, in addition to outside sources as the Islamic Sukuk. It is important to 
show how the leverage is affected by the illiquid assets of investments. These latter 
are generally financed by long-term financing Shariah-compliant contracts and 
equity, but the liquid assets are financed by short-term liabilities. Each financing 
process could be related to a financial instability issue of banks.      
In contrast to short-term liabilities financing liquid assets, the failure in illiquid 
assets financing long-term debts and equity would be more related to the financial 
bank instability issue. Dissimilarly to short-term highly liquid assets that can be 
liquidated easily by sales, the long-term highly illiquid assets can be liquidated 
only at a high cost i.e. with loss. In consequence, the share of bank illiquid assets in 
total assets is directly related to bank financial instability, and should be 
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characterized explicitly in indices measuring bank stability. The g-score seems to 
be more appropriate to describe this important component of bank capitalization. 
As in the z-score, the decrease of 𝜎 𝐼𝐴 𝐴   increases the g-score indicating less risk 
of illiquidity, whereas the increase of 𝜎 𝐼𝐴 𝐴   decreases the g-score leading to 
more illiquidity risk. This latter can generate insolvency, and lead to financial 
failure of bank when liabilities exceed assets. The greater g-score indicates lower 
probability of bank insolvency risk; this index could be relatively stable when 
illiquid capitalization is large. Furthermore, the positive economic growth or at 
least the stability of the bank returns from illiquid assets can attract more deposits, 
hence increasing the current liquidity and working capital, and would prepare for 
more investment in illiquid assets.   
The ratio 𝐼𝐴 𝐴  would reflect a bank’s financing risk through long-term 
investments. If this ratio has a great value since 1 2 ≤ 1− 𝑟1 < 1, the greater this 
ratio is, the more likely withdrawals by depositors will expose bank to insolvency 
risk. In the double inequality, the lower bound is obtained by assuming that at least 
𝐿𝐴 = 𝐼𝐴, or in fact the bank tends to keep small or reasonable fraction as liquid 
assets, in comparison to illiquid assets, to face any shocks of deposit or withdraws 
through demand deposits. The upper bound is determined by supposing that the 
illiquid assets are predominant in the total assets. This hypothesis is more realistic 
since in the banking system there is a regulatory reserve defined by the monetary 
authority. Also, Wagner (2007) considers that if liquid asset increases, the capital 
requirement as stability instrument becomes a less effective. Lucas & McDonald 
(1992) model the optimal level of liquid assets and state that small banks hold more 
fraction of liquid assets than large and medium banks. Alger & Alger (1999) find 
that banks relying heavily on the deposits would face larger liquidity shocks. The 
insolvency risk could be managed by increasing the leverage of bank, which 
increase the credit risk of conventional bank or Sukuk risk of Islamic bank, and 
may reduce the ratio 𝐼𝐴 𝐴 . Also, a low ratio 𝐸 𝐴  may indicate that bank might 
encounter difficulties in obtaining financing through Sukuk selling, except if the 
bank expects to earn more from their illiquid assets. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The illiquidity could be a simple symptom of bank insolvency, it is important to 
consider a measure of stability using illiquidity assets to take care about the 
optimal allocation between liquid and illiquid assets of financial firms involved 
directly in economic growth. Instead of measuring the returns on all assets, we 
restrict to returns on illiquid i.e. long-term assets, which depend more on the real 
economic growth. The suggested stock-based g-score index can reflect the long-run 
dynamic of real investments of the banks. This index could be associated to the 
habitual flow-based z-score by focusing on the returns on illiquid assets. The 
complementarity of the two indices could be a road map of the banking stability. 
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